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Abstract 
 
Deliberative democracy grounds its legitimacy largely in the ability of speakers to 
participate on equal terms.  Yet theorists and practitioners have struggled with how to establish 
deliberative equality in the face of stark differences of power in liberal democracies.  Designers 
of innovative civic forums for deliberation often aim to neutralize inequities among participants 
through proportional inclusion of disempowered speakers and discourses.  In contrast, others 
argue that democratic equality is best achieved when disempowered groups deliberate in their 
own enclaves (interest groups, parties, and movements) before entering the broader public 
sphere.  Borrowing from each perspective, we argue that there are strong reasons to incorporate 
enclave deliberation among the disempowered within civic forums.  We support this claim by 
presenting case study evidence showing that participants in such forums can gain some of the 
same benefits of deliberation found in more heterogeneous groups (such as political knowledge, 
efficacy and trust), can consider a diversity of viewpoints rather than falling into groupthink and 
polarization, and can persuade external stakeholders of the legitimacy of the group’s 
deliberations. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
The struggle to balance the voices of lay citizens with the voices of experts and elites has 
always been a feature of deliberative democracy. In classical Athens, professional rhetors with 
greater education and knowledge of politics took the most active role in addressing the citizen 
Assembly.
1
  In the New England town meetings of the 1700s, achieving consensus often 
depended upon discounting the interests of those with the least status and trusting the judgment 
of “the kinds of men who had always held power in the town.”2  And, of course, most 
community members were denied standing as citizens and excluded from these deliberative 
bodies entirely. 
Over the past two decades, revived interest in the theory and practice of deliberation has 
been driven in part by a concern for achieving discursive equality in diverse and stratified 
societies.  Deliberation fulfills its special claims to democratic legitimacy when it focuses 
participants on decision-making based on how well they justify their views to one another rather 
than on participants’ “authority, status, numbers, money, or muscle”:  “Decisions resulting from 
deliberation may be more fair and legitimate because they result from reasons rather than 
arbitrary advantages.  They may be wiser because they allow a broad range of perspectives and 
information to be pooled together.”3 Despite their differences, some of the initial and most 
influential theories of deliberation have argued that deliberation among equals can occur if we 
privilege rational discourse over other forms of communication, require participants to orient 
arguments toward the common good rather than private or group interests, and prioritize arriving 
at some form of consensus rather than majority rule.
4
   
However, this initial phase of the “deliberative turn” in political theory has been widely 
criticized for perpetuating rather than resolving the problem of inequality.  Critics contend that 
“the demands for reason, consensus, and the common good may marginalize or exclude 
members of disadvantaged groups.”5  A vision of rational discourse in which speakers must give 
logical reasons and evidence for their positions favors “the talk of an identifiable and privileged 
sector” trained to engage in this kind of discourse.6  Considerable evidence from experimental 
psychology and traditional deliberative settings (such as juries and public hearings) suggests that 
those with more education and higher status speak more frequently and that “the vast gap 
between elite and citizen expertise is likely to make elites far more influential than citizens” in 
such contexts.
7
  In addition, insistence on consensus can suppress discussion of difficult 
differences in ways that “narrow the possible agenda for deliberation and thereby effectively 
silence some points of view,” especially the values and interests of the marginalized.8  Exclusive 
consideration of the common good can also be a subtle means of domination because 
“definitions of the common good are likely to express the interests and perspectives of the 
dominant groups in generalized terms.”9   
In response to these criticisms, many deliberative scholars have incorporated concerns 
about inequality into the theory of deliberative democracy.  Following Young and Sanders, some 
have adopted a broader notion of rationality that includes greater appreciation of the role of 
emotion, storytelling, and rhetoric as valuable elements of civic reasoning.
10
  Others have 
leavened the desire for consensus with an appreciation for productive disagreement that 
encourages participants to explore their differences and allows room for negotiating them or 
putting them to a majority vote.
11
  Some empirical evidence finds that contestation and 
disagreement can improve the quality of deliberation, for example by increasing the number of 
reasons citizens are able to generate for different positions, especially reasons why others might 
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have differing opinions.
12
  Others have rethought whether deliberation must always be oriented 
toward the common good, accepting that the “articulation of self-interest [has] a legitimate role 
in democratic deliberation, particularly in discussions of fair distribution.”13  Chambers offers a 
revised definition of deliberation that reflects many of these changes in thinking: 
We can say that deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, 
well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of 
discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants. Although 
consensus need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to 
pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood 
as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation.
14
 
A host of new civic forums that are increasingly informing and influencing public policy 
offer promising places for this kind of deliberation.  These forums include deliberative polls, 
consensus conferences, planning cells, citizens juries, 21
st
 century town meetings, citizens 
assemblies, and participatory budgeting.
15
  Despite their different designs, these civic forums all 
create “minipublics”16 – structured deliberations among microcosms of the public that generate 
recommendations, monitor government, and sometimes contribute directly to enacting policy.  In 
the past decade, these forums have helped shape many policy processes, including the state of 
Oregon’s healthcare reforms, the annual budgets of several Latin American cities, a proposal for 
electoral reform in British Columbia, Chicago’s community policing and school boards, the 
redevelopment plans for the former World Trade Center site in lower Manhattan, and Danish 
regulations on genetically modified foods.  To address potential inequalities, organizers of such 
forums have paid much attention to putting control over the selection of participants, framing of 
issues, structure of agendas, and definition of the goals of deliberation in the hands of 
intermediaries with no stake in the outcome, or multi-partisan groups that provide checks and 
balances on competing interests, or a mixture of both kinds of entities.  These forums also 
employ a wide array of procedural safeguards for ensuring that all can participate freely and 
equally in deliberation, including rules for discussion and moderators trained in eliciting 
participation from all and in minimizing domination by particular participants or ways of 
speaking.
17
  Several studies suggest that well-designed forums can succeed at diminishing 
patterns of inequality in participation and influence over public deliberation.
18
 
Still, some theorists have argued that boosting equality depends not simply on including 
disempowered groups in cross-cutting discussion with more privileged citizens and powerful 
institutions, but also on the ability of the marginalized to confer among themselves in their own 
social movement organizations, interest groups, or parties.  In this view, the disempowered need 
to be able to “oscillate between protected enclaves, in which they can explore their ideas in an 
environment of mutual encouragement, and more hostile but also broader surroundings in which 
they can test those ideas against the reigning reality.”19  Yet most of the innovative civic forums 
we have mentioned follow a process of inclusion of the marginalized within a random sample or 
quasi-representative microcosm of the public as a whole.
20
   
In this article we propose the incorporation of spaces for enclave deliberation for the 
disempowered within civic forums.  We argue why such a move could enhance the overall 
quality and equality of deliberative democracy in ways that deliberative theory and practice has 
not yet fully examined.  We are also aware of the potential pitfalls for democracy and the 
disempowered when people talk only amongst their “own kind,” and so we offer the proverbial 
two cheers rather than three for this kind of talk. But we see the dangers as surmountable when 
structured group discussion among the least powerful is sandwiched between prior and 
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subsequent exposure to actors in the broader policy sphere. We support our claims with evidence 
from a civic forum that was modified to foster deliberation among the disempowered – a 
consensus conference on the issue of municipal broadband Internet service. We conclude by 
considering how novel forms of deliberation among the least powerful might be built into 
different kinds of civic forums and how researchers might assess their value.  In doing so, we 
respond to deliberative scholars’ and practitioners’ calls for research on pressing questions about 
how the design and structure of deliberation affects its quality and outcomes, as well as the 
relationship between deliberation and advocacy or public involvement.
21
   
 
Enclave Deliberation and the Disempowered 
 
Before proceeding, we should note what we mean by disempowered groups.  Although 
power is multifaceted and can be historically fluid,
22
 at any given time and place there are 
identifiable groups that are “more difficult to organize, articulate, mobilize, and integrate into 
policy discussions.”23  They may be formally excluded from aspects of the political system (e.g., 
because they are denied voting rights or legal standing in administrative arenas) or may lack 
resources for effective organization and action.  Such groups typically exert demonstrably less 
influence on institutional and public policy making through organized lobbying, campaign 
contributions, legal advocacy, voting, and other major methods of affecting policy.
24
  As a result, 
policy makers serve these groups’ interests less well when they conflict with the interests of 
better organized groups possessed of greater resources to press their case.  Historical examples of 
the disempowered in the United States include African-Americans and women, especially prior 
to each group gaining effective ability to vote.  Perhaps the clearest examples in the 
contemporary U.S. are low-income people and undocumented immigrants.
25
 We stress, though, 
that our definition of disempowered is not limited to questions of identity.  The groups we have 
in mind may fall into identifiable demographic categories, as in the case of the gender or ethnic 
groups, but they may also be disempowered in relation to particular issues, regardless of other 
socio-demographic attributes or privileges they may enjoy.  
 
The Challenges 
 
At best, most deliberative democrats tend to tolerate with ambivalence the idea of 
deliberation among homogeneous groups.  Because there are good reasons to be cautious about 
enclave deliberation, we pause to review them before introducing the potential benefits. 
First, homogeneity can undermine the legitimacy of deliberation.   As Gastil suggests, 
many adherents to a “common good” vision of deliberative democracy are implicitly driven by 
the attempt to discover Rousseau’s general will – that expression of the public based on the 
common interest, rather than on the claims of factions (interest groups or stakeholders) or the 
aggregation of private individual views.
26
  A randomly selected or representative group is seen as 
more likely to transcend narrow interests and consider the common interest.
27
  A somewhat 
different normative rationale is that “outcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective 
assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in 
question,” or where those affected have at least an equal right to participate.28  In addition, even 
if we accept the legitimacy of some self-interested advocacy in deliberation, as we must 
realistically, a group that fails to include a broad cross-section of those who are most affected by 
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their decision will likely draw protest or indifference from those who feel that their interests 
were excluded.
29
 
Second, more homogeneous groups can limit the diversity of views considered and 
therefore the quality of deliberation.  At the extreme, enclave deliberation may breed groupthink, 
in which maintaining the unity of the group comes to outweigh all other aims.
30
  Such groups 
tend to make poor decisions based on incomplete and biased information and fail to weigh 
alternatives fully.  The classic signs of groupthink include overestimating the group’s power and 
moral justness, sharing an illusion of unanimous opinion among members (often based on self-
censorship and quashing dissent), and ignoring evidence that contradicts the group’s views.31  
Experimental research in social psychology often finds that homogeneous groups are also more 
vulnerable to group polarization, in which “members of a deliberating group predictably move 
toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation 
tendencies.”32  In this theory, the group fails to change or moderate its initial views because of 
social comparison, as members fear loss of reputation by being in the minority,
33
 or because the 
majority can supply more arguments for their position and thereby strengthen their confidence in 
their views, win over the undecided, and silence opponents.
34
  In either case, group members do 
not decide based on the strongest arguments.  Groups are most likely to polarize if they see 
themselves as sharing an identity that is made salient to them during deliberation (such as party 
affiliation, race, gender, or profession) and if they meet regularly over time while insulating 
themselves from competing views.
35
 Democratic theorists, most notably Cass Sunstein, therefore 
warn that greater homogeneity, especially among the disempowered, could lead to a greater 
sense of alienation from government and citizens outside the group, increasing mistrust and 
undermining individual self-efficacy.
36
 
 
The Potentials 
 
Despite these concerns, some deliberative democrats see value in enclave deliberation 
among those with little power, especially as it occurs within voluntary organizations and social 
movements. There are several justifications for creating spaces within any democratic society for 
enclave deliberation among disempowered groups.   
First, if enclave deliberation violates the ideal that all who are affected by a decision 
should have an equal opportunity to participate in making it, this is not a normative problem so 
long as enclave deliberation is one step in a larger public discussion that includes cross-cutting 
talk between social groups.  Furthermore, the notion that all who may be affected must have a 
chance to be selected to deliberate through representative sampling is impractical in almost all 
cases. Strictly speaking, representative sampling for deliberation is enormously difficult and 
presents legitimacy problems of its own, even setting aside basic rights of free association.  Ryfe 
summarizes the main reasons why.
37
  It is impractical, and often impossible, to reconcile the 
demands of deliberation in small groups with the numbers required to achieve a representative 
sample of any large scale polity.  If legitimacy requires that all those who are affected by a 
decision should be sampled, it is difficult to determine the boundaries of such a group given the 
interdependence of local, national, and global politics.  And if participants are chosen to ensure 
that all major viewpoints or communities are represented, deliberators are also expected to learn 
and be open to changing their views as they discuss them with others, which means that 
participants may no longer represent the positions or communities that justified their inclusion in 
the first place.  Thus, “by fulfilling one deliberative principle (learning), the method short-
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circuits another (representativeness).”38  Enclave deliberation does not elude these difficulties.  
Our point is that attempts at representativeness do not necessarily guarantee greater deliberative 
legitimacy than attempts to recruit enclaves. 
Second, requiring consensus does not guarantee that those who hold minority views will 
be coerced.  Mendelberg’s review of the empirical literature concludes that the effect of decision 
rules on deliberation depends on a range of contextual factors, including homogeneity.
39
  
Empirical evidence shows that in groups of friends, women, or social equals, for example, 
requiring unanimity rather than majority rule can spark “deliberation that makes people more 
open-minded and willing to listen to minority views, resolving conflict properly and leaving 
deliberators feeling that everyone received a fair hearing.”40  Though such outcomes are not 
always to be found, they may be especially likely in groups that develop a strong sense of 
community with shared interests and norms.
41
  It may be safer for people to reconsider their 
views among their peers than in more diverse settings, where defending minority identities 
against the majority may be more salient.
42
 
Third, as Sunstein concedes, even if group polarization occurs, this is not an inherently 
undesirable outcome from a normative standpoint.  At any given place or time, a normatively 
laudable position that is perceived as “extreme” by the majority – such as calling for the 
abolition of slavery in the United States in the early 1800s – may be more just than a “moderate” 
stance.  Thus, to reject all instances of polarization within disempowered groups would be to 
adopt a conservative bias against innovative views or a centrist bias against minority positions. 
In at least some instances, polarization among disempowered groups may be a sign of 
deliberative breakthrough, not deliberative dysfunction.  Similarly, genuine deliberation does not 
have to end in movement away from participants’ pre-discussion attitudes.43  As long as 
participants hear and seriously consider a range of views, it is as legitimate for deliberation to 
clarify and strengthen deliberators’ pre-existing positions as to change them.   
Fourth, the deliberation of the disempowered may be necessary to broaden the range of 
voices and views in the wider public sphere. Self-selected participants in organized public 
discussion tend to be disproportionately white, middle class or affluent college graduates, which 
undermines the aim of equal participation and diversity of views by failing to involve those who 
participate less in the political system.
44
 Therefore, as Sunstein observes: 
A certain measure of isolation will, in some cases, be crucial to the development of ideas 
and approaches that would not otherwise emerge and that deserve a social hearing. 
Members of low-status groups are often quiet within heterogeneous bodies, and 
deliberation in such bodies tends to be dominated by high-status members. Any shift . . . 
that increases the number of deliberating enclaves will likewise increase the diversity of 
society’s aggregate ‘argument pool’.45 
Enclave deliberation can thus serve the larger cause of a fully inclusive public discourse by 
giving disempowered or marginalized groups an opportunity to develop their own unique 
perspectives and arguments, which might otherwise be overlooked or ignored. 
Fifth, as the anti-slavery and African American civil rights movements demonstrate as 
well, enclaves can serve equality by allowing marginalized groups to coalesce by discovering 
their common interests and identities, strengthening their resolve to advocate for themselves, and 
building organizations that can do so effectively.
46
  By removing professional experts and high-
status citizens from the group’s deliberation over policy positions, enclave deliberation may 
allow disempowered participants to overcome oft-observed forms of coercion by elites, leading 
to greater group solidarity and political efficacy.
47
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Our review of the advantages and disadvantages of enclave deliberation suggests that 
there are in fact three kinds of enclaves that are sometimes conflated and that contextual factors, 
not simply the existence of common ties, have a good deal to do with whether such groups will 
polarize..  One kind of enclave consists of ad hoc groups who share similar pre-deliberation 
views on the issue at hand, such as the typical groups convened by experimental researchers in 
the lab.  An example would be a racially and economically diverse group of U.S. citizens 
convened to discuss whether documented and undocumented immigrants in the USA should be 
given citizenship rights, in which a majority of the group already holds pro-immigrant views.  
Another type of enclave, suggested by the defense of homogeneous groups as a means of 
discovering affiliations and contributing new perspectives to the public sphere, may be defined 
as one in which members occupy a shared structural location in relation to the issue.  In relation 
to the immigration example, such groups would include immigration lawyers, public school 
educators who teach immigrant children, or employers who depend on immigrant labor.  A third 
kind of enclave may be defined as one in which members feel that they share a common pre-
deliberation identity.  This definition is suggested by experimental studies that find groups 
perceiving themselves as sharing an identity are more likely to polarize during deliberation and 
also by defenses of enclave deliberation as a tool for strengthening solidarity among groups, 
especially in the social movement literature cited above.  For the immigration debate, examples 
would be groups of Mexican-Americans or Irish-Americans, some of whom have lived as 
citizens in the USA for generations and others who are relative newcomers, but all of whom see 
themselves in part through the prism of their ethnic identity.  It is possible for an enclave to share 
a viewpoint, location, and identity, but our point is that this cannot be assumed by 
predeliberation agreement on an issue, or common social circumstances, or shared demographic 
characteristics (such as race).  One need not embrace a postmodern theory of identity as radically 
contingent to appreciate that our self-concepts and views are shaped in part by group contexts 
and cues that make some aspects of our identity more salient than others. 
Further, in each kind of enclave, the salience of members’ viewpoints, locations, and 
identities may depend in part on the kind of issue that is put to them.  Again, the context of group 
discussion can make potential enclave relationships either more or less salient.  It may be that 
polarization is less likely to occur if the issue is not one that draws attention to their common 
bonds (e.g., for immigration lawyers, whether to ban burning of the U.S. flag or to repeal the 
estate tax), or if the organizer of the deliberation does not make group members’ potential 
common stake in the issue more salient to them (e.g, by addressing them as “Mexican-
Americans” or “Irish-Americans”), or if the group is confronted with an issue that is just 
emerging into public discourse and therefore is not easily incorporated into group members’ 
existing political schemas (such as whether to offer public subsidies for nanotechnology 
research).
48
   
 With these understandings of enclaves and their potential roles in the discursive 
landscape in mind, we suggest that new civic forums could provide important spaces for enclave 
deliberation by the dispossessed.  Such forums are designed to foster deliberation of higher 
quality and legitimacy than in many other contexts in which deliberation often fails, such as 
informal conversations among social networks
49
 or traditional public hearings and meetings.
50
  
Civic forums are more likely to provide the conditions for successful deliberation on equal terms 
that have been identified by empirical research.
51
  When these deliberative events are designed 
well, participants have access to a great deal of information, including from experts and 
stakeholders, and a broad range of arguments (to counteract groupthink and polarization).  
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Groups perceive the stakes of their decision as consequential for the wider policy sphere 
(sustaining the motivation to deliberate).  A broad range of discursive styles, from rational 
argument to personal anecdotes, are accepted as valid in discussion (providing an inclusive 
climate).  Supportive facilitation helps guide and model deliberative thinking for the group 
(offering training in what is an unfamiliar form of communication for many).  Discursive rules 
protect participants’ equal opportunity to participate and foster mutual respect (creating a 
willingness to consider others’ views and build trust).  In this way, a well-designed civic forum 
may serve to enhance the laudable qualities of enclave deliberation, while simultaneously 
guarding against its more worrisome possibilities. 
 
Consensus Conference Case Study 
 
To evaluate our claim that civic forums could improve conditions of equality by 
incorporating enclave deliberation by the marginalized, we draw on evidence from an established 
format for cross-cutting deliberation – the consensus conference – that was modified to foster 
deliberation among the disempowered about their interests.  Consensus conferences aim to 
promote informed public deliberation among small groups of community members to arrive at 
policy recommendations by unanimous decision.
52
  Developed by the Danish Board of 
Technology and adopted by government and civil society groups around the world, consensus 
conferences have mainly focused on science and technology policy.  In an ideal-typical 
conference, the project’s organizers appoint an advisory panel of stakeholders on the topic at 
hand to oversee the fairness and inclusiveness of the conference.  The advisory panel reviews the 
process of selecting and educating a panel of 12 to 25 community members.  Conference 
organizers provide the community panel with background briefing papers about the issue, some 
of which may be written from a neutral perspective on the issues, while others may reflect the 
views of different stakeholders.  The organizers and advisory panel select a group of experts 
representing a wide range of perspectives on the controversy. A facilitator helps the community 
panel to identify the questions they want to pose directly to the experts at a public hearing.  After 
the hearing, the facilitator leads the community panel in structured deliberation to produce a 
consensus statement of policy recommendations.  Significantly, the community panel is not 
restricted to choosing between options provided to them by others on a predetermined agenda of 
issues, but is free to add their own issues and solutions throughout the process.  Their findings 
are presented publicly to government, the news media, and the public to amplify the panel’s 
voice, attract attention to the issue, and stimulate ongoing deliberation.   
However, the traditional consensus conference is vulnerable to the same concerns about 
inequality that we have reviewed earlier.  The organizers and advisory panel may subtly 
marginalize some views in their selection of briefing materials, community panelists, and 
experts.  Norms of rationality and consensus may discriminate against community panelists who 
have less education, deliberative experience, and socio-economic status.  Consideration of the 
common good and the goal of consensus may lead to coercion of those with minority viewpoints.  
To counteract these concerns, the conference organizers in this case study departed from 
standard practice by exclusively recruiting members of disempowered groups to form the 
community panel.  Explaining how and why the panelists were chosen requires some discussion 
of the issues the conference addressed. 
 
Municipal Broadband and Digital Inclusion 
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In response to the slow and uneven extension of commercial high-speed Internet service 
in the United States in the mid-2000s, hundreds of municipal governments began considering 
whether to build their own broadband networks, triggering a robust policy debate over whether 
cities should invest public funds in such endeavors at all, and, if so, whether to subsidize access 
for those least likely to have it.
53
  In Silicon Valley, where the conference was held, an alliance 
of over 40 cities had begun to plan one of the largest regional wireless broadband networks in the 
country.  Some municipal broadband projects, such as Philadelphia’s and San Francisco’s, had 
put a high priority on the goal of offering affordable broadband to all residents to close the 
digital divide between those with high-speed service and those without it.  However, the Silicon 
Valley broadband network was driven primarily by the goals of improving economic 
competitiveness and the internal communications of government agencies.
54
   The project was 
spearheaded by Wireless Silicon Valley (WSV), a task force led by city and county Information 
Technology managers that also included local electrical utilities, county sheriff departments, and 
public transportation authorities.   
In a context of low public attention to the project, two centers based at Santa Clara 
University – the Broadband Institute of California and the Center for Science, Technology and 
Society – organized a consensus conference in October 2006 on municipal broadband and digital 
inclusion.
55
   At the outset, the conference organizers (a law professor, a communication 
professor, a political science professor, and a professional facilitator) posed several broad 
questions for the conference to address, especially with reference to the planned Silicon Valley 
network: 
1. Should governments become involved in creating municipal broadband networks? 
2. If so, how should municipal broadband networks be paid for and operated to maximize 
public benefits, especially to underserved communities?   
3. If so, will digital inclusion require governments to provide additional resources to help 
underserved communities use broadband to meet their economic, civic, and cultural 
needs? 
56
 
The conference offered the first substantive effort at public consultation about the Silicon Valley 
project, in an environment of sparse media coverage of the proposed network and no organized 
attempts to influence its direction by civil society organizations. The WSV director sat on the 
advisory panel for the conference; he and representatives from several of the private partners 
chosen to build the network testified to the community panel at the public hearing.  Although 
some of the contours of the network had been defined – including private ownership and 
management – much was still to be determined, including subscription costs and digital inclusion 
efforts.  Therefore, the community panel had a unique opportunity to influence the project’s 
decision-makers, although it was clear that its recommendations were advisory, not binding. 
Instead of recruiting a community panel reflective of Silicon Valley as a whole, the 
organizers formed an enclave, each of whom was a member of at least one of the groups that had 
the lowest rates of home access to commercial broadband in the U.S. at the time: low-income 
people, African-Americans, Hispanics, seniors, the disabled, and rural residents.
57
  All of these 
groups were represented on the panel and many participants fell into more than one of these 
categories (e.g., African-American and disabled).  Although the conference brought community 
panelists in contact with the views of government and industry leaders through background 
readings and the public hearing, the group’s deliberation about its policy recommendations 
focused on the task of articulating the interests of a disempowered group relative to the issue of 
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broadband access, rather than on consideration of the common good (which might have included 
the interests of telecommunications companies, which feared competition from municipal 
networks, and other residents who could easily afford broadband access, and who therefore 
might not have been as willing to invest tax dollars in providing access to those who could not 
afford it).  Thus, the panel formed an enclave in the sense that all shared a structural position as 
belonging to a group that was least served by home broadband Internet service.  In deliberation, 
as they were asked by the conference organizers to consider recommendations for connecting 
these groups to broadband, the community panel likely developed a stronger shared identity as 
members and representatives of the underserved.
58
   
Other elements of the project adhered to the typical consensus conference format.  The 
organizers recruited an advisory panel of 11 stakeholders from local governments, civil society 
organizations working on digital inclusion, and the technology and telecommunications 
industries.  The advisory panel approved plans for recruiting community panelists, reviewed a 
briefing paper to ensure that it was fair and inclusive of major perspectives on the issues, and 
approved the composition of the experts who testified at the public hearing.  Panelists received 
the briefing paper about one month prior to the conference. During the first weekend of the 
conference, the organizers gave community panelists a presentation on the issues summarized in 
the briefing paper to refresh their memories and responded to the panel’s questions.  The 
facilitator helped the group prioritize and define their questions about the issues for the experts 
and identify additional readings for each member based on her or his interests.  During the 
second weekend, the community panel posed their questions to 11 experts from industry, 
government, and community organizations who testified at the public hearing, then began their 
deliberations in small groups focused on specific issues and in the full group. During the third 
weekend, the facilitator helped the community members come to consensus on policy 
recommendations.  The organizers publicized the community panel’s policy recommendations 
widely to government, industry, community organizations, and the news media.
59
  In addition, 
several months later the organizers convened a follow-up forum by videoconference to discuss 
the community panel’s recommendations with 60 representatives of municipalities, community 
groups, and municipal broadband service providers in four California cities where similar 
projects were planned or underway. 
In its recommendations, the panel agreed that local governments should commission and 
control municipal broadband networks, with private companies building and operating the 
networks, especially to reach the underserved.  The panel also made detailed recommendations 
on how cities could extend broadband access to underserved groups by subsidizing computer 
hardware and software, provide training, design networks to be accessible to people with 
disabilities and non-English speakers, protect users’ privacy and security, serve rural areas, and 
involve the public in network planning and oversight.
60
 
 
Research Questions 
 
Because this was exploratory research, rather than developing formal hypotheses, we 
posed research questions, which aimed to address some likely concerns of deliberative democrats 
and their critics about this example of structured enclave deliberation.  First, did the enclave 
group become sufficiently well-informed about the issues it considered?  Second, did the enclave 
group experience positive changes in civic attitudes that are often found in successful 
deliberation among more heterogeneous groups?  Prior research indicates that deliberation in 
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mixed groups can increase issue knowledge, interest in politics, trust in government, individual 
self-efficacy, trust in others, and commitment to the common good.
61
  Deliberative democrats 
may fear that the absence of information and viewpoints that more educated participants can 
bring to the discussion might weaken the group’s information base and ability to build trust 
across social differences. Meanwhile, many critics of deliberation argue that the disempowered 
need to participate in social movements to acquire authentic issue knowledge and self-efficacy.
62
  
Our first and second questions are an attempt to understand the extent to which enclave 
deliberation can also be a valuable school for democracy, helping participants build the 
knowledge and skills needed to go forth and participate in mainstream policy circles on many 
issues.   
Third, was the group able to consider a diversity of views, avoiding both groupthink and 
group polarization stemming from social comparison?  Deliberative scholars’ greatest concern 
about enclaves may be that they are unable to see beyond their similarities and come to 
appreciate the potential diversity of perspectives within their group.  Fourth, were the 
deliberative process and outcomes seen as legitimate – both internally (by community panelists) 
and externally (by experts and policy makers in government, activists, and industry figures)?  We 
have seen that despite their differences, both deliberative democrats and their critics appeal to the 
values of internal equality and autonomy, which may be threatened especially by the domination 
of forum organizers, expert authority, and mainstream ideology.   Deliberation’s proponents and 
critics also raise concerns about whether its process and outcomes can be seen as legitimate by 
outsiders.
63
  In particular, there is a danger that external stakeholders will dismiss the 
deliberation as poorly informed, not open to diverse viewpoints, and powerless to influence 
public discourse. These worries may be especially well-founded when deliberation takes place 
among disempowered groups, who may be seen by others as less knowledgeable and more 
partisan than more heterogeneous, representative groupings. 
 
Methods 
 
 To answer our research questions, we surveyed many different groups involved in the 
consensus conference process, including the community panel, a non-deliberating control group, 
advisory and expert panelists, and participants in the follow-up event on municipal broadband in 
California.   
The community panel and control group were recruited by distributing applications to 
approximately 80 social service agencies and community-based organizations.  Almost all of the 
members of each group were clients of these organizations.  Two in the community panel (or 17 
percent) and four in the control group (or 27 percent) were staff members (computer instructors 
to the disabled or elderly), but none occupied leadership positions in their organizations. To 
encourage open deliberation, applicants who were employed by or belonged to an organization 
that had previously taken a public position on municipal broadband were excluded from both the 
community panel and control group.  From the 95 applications received, the organizers selected 
12 community panel members and 15 control group members, each of whom belonged to at least 
one group with the lowest rates of home broadband access: low-income people (defined as 
household earnings below 50 percent of four-county median income), African-Americans, 
Hispanics, seniors, the disabled, and rural residents.
64
  However, to ensure that each group had 
enough experience of home broadband access to discuss whether it was valuable, the organizers 
required that at least half of the community and control group had home access.  Table 1 reports 
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the characteristics of each group.  Although assignment to the control group was not strictly 
random (availability on the conference weekends sometimes determined placement in control or 
community group, for example), the two groups were fairly evenly matched, with two 
exceptions.  The control group had slightly fewer years of education on average (although the 
difference is mainly between those with some college and a college diploma), and the control 
group had somewhat greater access to broadband at home. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The community panelists responded to surveys one month prior to the start of the 
conference, at the end of each weekend of the conference, and again one month following the 
conference’s completion.65  The control group completed survey questionnaires prior to the 
consensus conference and again one month after its completion.
66
  Advisory panelists and 
experts who testified at the public hearing completed online questionnaires one month prior to 
the conference and one month after its completion.   The experts and advisors were about evenly 
split between the telecommunications industry (n=5); civil society organizations working for 
digital inclusion (n=7); and representatives, consultants, and service providers to local 
governments (n=6).  Follow-up event participants (n=57), who were asked to review the 
recommendations of the community panelists, were about evenly split between the government 
and civil society categories.  The response rate for the community and control panels was 100 
percent, for the advisors and experts 39 percent, and for the follow-up event participants 61 
percent.
67
  (We present operational measures along with our findings). 
 These data present limitations and strengths.  Like most case studies, this one involves a 
quasi-experimental design involving a small number of participants in a unique context, all of 
which requires some prudence about the external validity and the generalizability of our findings.  
On the other hand, our case study approach also has some signal virtues for assessing the quality 
and equity of enclave deliberation.  Compared with much of the research on enclave deliberation, 
which involves one-time discussions in a lab setting among college students, we are able to train 
the analytical microscope in fine detail on the dynamics of participant attitudes over an extended 
period of deliberation about a current issue of real-world significance.  Repeated inquiry about 
community panelists’ impressions of both the process and the substance of the issues allows us 
to show how participant attitudes changed (or remained constant) during the course of the 
deliberations.  Much research on deliberation, such as that on deliberative polls, has been 
critiqued for failing to distinguish the effect of providing participants with more information on a 
topic from the impact of deliberation itself.  The skeptics suggest that if the benefits attributed to 
deliberation are in fact merely the result of being more informed about a range of policy 
positions by briefing materials, or exposure to public officials, then perhaps deliberation is 
unnecessary.
68
  Our research design surveyed participants before they received a briefing paper, 
at the end of all three weekends of deliberation, and one month after the conclusion of the 
conference – a research design that allows us to discern the effects of the initial provision of 
information and discussion on a number of outcomes more precisely than prior research.  In 
addition, we are able assess the external legitimacy of the deliberation through surveys of a 
diverse group of policy advocates, industry, and government decision-makers. In all, this case 
study provides some of the most careful, detailed empirical data available today of structured 
enclave deliberation among the less powerful. 
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Findings and Discussion 
 
Information 
 
 Our first research question asked about whether the enclave group was sufficiently well-
informed about the issues it considered. A potential concern about deliberation in more 
homogeneous groups is that participants may not gain sufficient knowledge about an issue 
because they will not be exposed to facts that support alternative positions and will not have to 
deploy facts that support their positions to persuade others.  There is reason to expect that 
community panelists might lack basic information, given their relatively low levels of internet 
access and familiarity with municipal broadband prior to the conference.   
 
Figures 1a-1b about here 
 
 We begin with some objective measures of panelists’ knowledge, which are broad 
indicators of basic learning that do not attempt to capture the sum of participants’ issue 
knowledge.  However, panelists’ inability to report this information would raise doubts about 
whether they were sufficiently well-informed.  Our evidence shows that participants came to 
know important facts about broadband technology over the course of their involvement with the 
conference.  Whereas only two-thirds of panelists could describe the difference between 
broadband and dial-up Internet service without prompting prior to the conference, more than 90 
percent correctly answered the question one month after the conference’s conclusion (see Figure 
1a).  Knowledge levels of the control group also increased, but by only 7 percentage points, as 
opposed to the 25 points among the community panelists.  In addition, compared to their pre-
conference responses, community panelists were able to generate a significantly longer list of 
activities computer users could engage in with broadband but not with dialup access.  As Figure 
1b shows, community panelists were able to offer, on average, almost one more advantage of 
broadband after the conference than before it (p=.017) – an increase of nearly 70 percent, 
compared with little improvement in the control group. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Community panelists also gained a better sense of how access to broadband within the 
United States compares to access in other countries.  Whereas prior to the conference no 
community panelist could correctly rank the U.S. among OECD countries in broadband 
subscribers per capita, fully three-quarters of community panelists could do so one month after 
the deliberations, while the control group exhibited essentially no change (see Figure 2).
69
   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
These objective measures of information are strengthened by the subjective impressions 
of both conference participants and outside observers.  Table 2 highlights participants’ sense of 
their own levels of knowledge after each of the three consensus conference weekends as well as 
at-a-distance summary judgments from advisory panelists and experts who testified to the panel 
at a public hearing.  From the first weekend on, participants felt that they were receiving high-
quality information about municipal broadband, and they expressed strong agreement with the 
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idea that they were learning new information and considering new points of view.  Just as 
importantly, community panelists appeared to grasp that they had much to learn and that such 
learning would continue over the course of each conference weekend.  In other words, 
participants felt that they gained new information as the deliberation proceeded across each 
weekend.  For them, learning about the issues appeared to include more than simply reading the 
background briefing paper, and their subjective sense of learning continued through the final full 
weekend of deliberation.  After the first two weekends, participants were, on average, unsure 
whether they understood enough to make effective recommendations, but by the end of the last 
weekend, when they completed their policy recommendations, the panelists felt strongly that 
their conclusions had been backed by sufficient information. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence supporting this point is provided by the outside experts 
who observed or testified at the conference’s public hearing and read the group’s policy 
recommendations. As Table 2 highlights, these experts tended to share participants’ impression 
that they were provided with sufficient information to produce well-grounded policy 
recommendations.  In addition, the experts who observed the public hearing came away satisfied 
that the community panelists were conversant in the important issues and found the panel’s 
policy recommendations exhibited a solid understanding of “the basic issues surrounding 
municipal broadband.”  
We interpret this combination of evidence as cause for optimism about well-structured 
enclave deliberation’s ability to inform disempowered participants sufficiently, though additional 
research is needed to explore the limits of such learning. Still, these results point to the 
conclusion that organizers of structured deliberations can ensure that information relevant to a 
broad range of arguments is provided and considered through background briefing papers, 
presentations, hearings, and facilitation that gently challenges participants to support their 
arguments with factual claims as well as other forms of evidence.  In addition, these findings 
suggest that the effects of the initial provision of information in the briefing paper, exposure to 
experts at the public hearing, and deliberation among the group cannot be as neatly disentangled 
as skeptics of deliberation suggest.  Participants did not simply stop learning after reading the 
briefing paper.  Instead, they strongly agreed that they learned new information and discovered 
new perspectives on all three weekends of the conference (see Table 2), including the third 
weekend devoted entirely to their deliberations among themselves.  The assumption that non-
experts could absorb all the information they need from reading a paper, or from interaction with 
experts, is not borne out by our data.  Rather, the community panelists repeatedly indicated that 
they learned in part through discussion with their peers.  Given the striking consistency of their 
responses, it seems unlikely that other benefits from the conference discussed below can be 
attributed entirely to upfront provision of information or exposure to experts and not at all to 
deliberation. 
 
Attitudes 
 
 Second, we asked whether the enclave group experienced positive changes in civic 
attitudes that are often found in successful deliberation among more heterogeneous groups.  To 
the extent that these attitudinal benefits depend on interacting with a diverse set of deliberators, 
greater homogeneity, especially among the disempowered, could lead to a greater sense of 
disempowerment, difference or alienation from government and citizens outside the group, 
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increasing resentment or mistrust.  Therefore, we administered a plethora of measures of these 
attitudes before and after the conference to the community panel and control group. 
 On a number of measures, we found that the conference did not provoke statistically 
meaningful change.  Participation in the conference had no significant effects on broader interest 
in local politics or broadband policy, frequency of discussion of local affairs or broadband 
policy, trust in local government, confidence in speaking abilities, assessments of local 
government decision-making processes, confidence in the competency of average people to deal 
with a complex political world, or belief in the ability of ordinary people to consider all opinions 
or to back up their opinions with good reasons.  On the other hand, the conference did not lead to 
any meaningful declines on these measures of civic attitudes, either.
70
  We note, too, that 
community participants came to the conference with generally high levels of interest in politics 
and confidence in the abilities of ordinary people, so the lack of change can be attributed, in part, 
to a ceiling effect.  In addition, with respect to some measures, such as trust in local government 
or assessments of local decision-making, it is not clear that the conference should have provoked 
change, as community panelists had little direct exposure to local politicians or decision-making 
processes. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
 At the same time, we found moderate but statistically meaningful effects on some 
measures of efficacy and trust.  The strongest changes in internal efficacy came with respect to 
respondents’ sense that they were well-qualified to participate in community politics (see Figure 
3).  While the control group trended slightly in the opposite direction, community panelists 
tended to feel more confident about their abilities after participating in the consensus conference, 
moving approximately one-half point on the 5-point scale, a change that is significant at the 90 
percent confidence level (p=.06).   
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 Community panelists’ levels of interpersonal trust and their sense of ordinary individuals’ 
commitment to the common good also increased meaningfully over the course of the conference.    
Interpersonal trust was measured with a three-item scale coded to range between 0 and 1, with 
higher numbers indicating greater trust.
71
  Mean levels of trust among the control group did not 
change at all, while the community group saw an increase of over 11 percentage points on the 
scale.  This change is significant at the .10 level, which we interpret as meaningful movement, 
considering the small sample size.  As Figure 4 shows, the difference between the control group 
and the community panel increased over time, with the post-conference difference between the 
two groups reaching nearly a quarter of the trust scale, a difference that achieves solid levels of 
statistical significance (p=.06).   
 Similarly, the community panel showed an increasing commitment to the notion that 
most people can overcome their self-interest and pursue the common good.  The survey question 
asked respondents how much they agree or disagree with the statement: “Most people are too 
self-interested to agree on solutions that serve the common good.”  While the control group 
showed a slight movement in the direction of increasing agreement with the statement, the 
community panel moved sharply in the other direction.  Among the community panelists, the 
pre-conference mean was 2.5 (1=”strongly agree”, 5=“strongly disagree”), while the post-
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conference mean increased to 3.08 – not yet strong levels of disagreement, but definite 
movement in that direction.  This change exceeds standard levels of statistical significance 
(p=.03).   
 As a whole, the consensus conference did not fundamentally alter most of the 
participants’ attitudes about local government, including levels of interest in and discussion of 
local politics or municipal broadband.  Given that the conference lasted for only three weekends, 
and participants’ relatively high initial levels of interest and engagement, it is perhaps too much 
to expect dramatic improvement in these attitudes.  Yet participants also did not become more 
disillusioned about their ability to participate meaningfully in civic life. We find solid evidence 
that the conference increased respondents’ confidence in their qualifications to participate in 
politics and increased resistance to the notion that politics are too complicated for people like 
them to deal with.  We also found that conference participation increased social trust and 
bolstered optimism that people can see beyond narrow self-interests to a broader public good.  
These results contradict concerns that enclave deliberation further alienates participants from 
mainstream civic life. 
 
Diversity of Views 
 
 Our third set of research questions asked whether conference participants were able to 
consider a broad range of views rather than succumbing to groupthink (failing to consider 
diverse views in order to maintain group unity) or polarization (moving toward an extreme 
position in the direction to which the group was initially inclined) for the wrong reasons (social 
comparison rather than free reflection on the best arguments).  We expected that quality 
deliberation would be marked by the ability to recognize points of common agreement, but also 
to acknowledge the presence of disagreement when it existed.
72
  In contrast, groupthink would be 
characterized by a heavy focus on consensus without recognition of a diversity of opinions 
within the panel.  Group polarization sparked by social comparison would be indicated by an 
extreme shift in position in order to avoid conflict within the group. 
 
Figures 5a and 5b about here. 
 
Early in the process, most community panelists did not perceive differences of opinion 
among the group.  As Figure 5a reveals, after the first weekend most participants strongly 
disagreed that “important disagreements” separated the panelists.  In response to an open-ended 
query about what the panelists “disagreed most” about, many panelists could not name any point 
of disagreement.  However, the first weekend’s activities focused on learning about the issues, 
identifying needs for additional information, and forming questions to pose at the public hearing, 
rather than on deliberation about the benefits of different policies.  It is likely that the group 
perceived little discord because their group activities that week were focused on seeking 
information rather than taking positions. However, as participants shifted into deliberation over 
their policy recommendations during the second and third weekends, they reported an increase in 
disagreement about the issues under discussion and a much greater variety of perspectives being 
discussed (see Figures 5a and 5b).  By the end of the final weekend, all twelve participants could 
name at least one important difference of opinion among group members in response to open-
ended queries.  In their assessments of the conference one month after its conclusion, community 
panelists judged that allowing “people to air differences of opinion and discuss different points 
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of view” was one of the most important goals of the conference (mean=6.75, SD=0.62 on a 1 to 
7 scale, where 1= “not important at all” and 7 = “very important”).73  
Despite their perception of more differences being aired as the conference proceeded, the 
participants generally found these different perspectives were welcomed, considered, and 
respected, rather than being a source of discomfort (see Table 3).  Even on the final conference 
weekend, when disagreements were confronted directly and the sometimes arduous work of 
forging agreement in the face of strong and diverse opinions took place, most panelists still felt 
relatively comfortable with the deliberative exchange.  Most said the process helped them to 
consider alternative points of view rather than closing off consideration of diverse opinions.  
When asked a month later whether the conference process had caused them to rethink their initial 
positions about municipal broadband, only two panelists said that it had not.  In the end, the 
panelists were able to come to consensus on ten pages of detailed policy recommendations.  By 
the conclusion of the third conference weekend, their mean level of agreement with the statement 
“I fully support all of the community panel’s policy recommendations” was 1.5 on a scale from 1 
(strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) (SD=.492). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
These findings run in precisely the opposite direction expected by critics of enclave 
deliberation.  Instead of groupthink, in which consensus is based on silencing dissent or adopting 
an illusory sense of unanimous agreement in the interests of group unity, participants 
increasingly recognized that their consensus emerged from a climate characterized by real 
differences of opinion. Rather than undesirable group polarization, in which members tip 
unreflectively toward an extreme position in which the group inclines in order to save face or 
follow perceived group norms, participants became increasingly aware of conflicts amongst 
themselves, but were not made uncomfortable by them, and still achieved consensus on those 
recommendations upon which they could agree.   
On the two issues that provoked the longest debates, the panel hammered out carefully 
considered agreements that were inclusive compromises rather than a movement toward an 
extreme position.  One debate focused on the role of private companies in operating municipal 
networks.  After much discussion, the panelists agreed that “municipal governments should be 
involved in developing and controlling broadband networks and should require private 
companies to operate the networks in ways that provide public benefits.”74  The panel suggested 
that “a broadband oversight committee could be established with equal representation of public, 
private and municipal interests. Ongoing public input should inform decisions about these 
networks.  However, private companies should build and operate the networks.”75  This 
recommendation expressed a nuanced compromise between those who prioritized private firms’ 
expertise at building networks and those who prioritized government oversight to protect the 
public interest.  Similarly, although the panelists agreed that broadband was a necessity, they 
recognized that they could not come to consensus on whether a free tier of service should be 
offered to low-income residents.
76
  Some participants felt a free service would be accompanied 
by a significant drawback – that some low-income people like themselves would fail to value 
and use the service if they did not have to pay for it.  They also worried that a free tier would 
mean something less than full equality of access, given the likelihood that a free service would 
mean fewer online tools and benefits than paying households would get.  A deeply committed 
minority was unwilling, however, to cede their view that free service was integral to digital 
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inclusion.  Thus, after a long and sometimes contentious discussion about the meaning of 
equality for disadvantaged groups and the tension between price and quality of service, the panel 
agreed to recommend a “free or discounted tier” for low-income residents, but insisted that the 
lowest-price tiers, whether or free or not, should offer the same speed, privacy, and security as a 
full-price tier of service offered to paying households.
77
   
These findings contradict the groupthink and polarization theories of enclave 
deliberation.  They suggest that the panelists achieved a high-quality consensus not based on the 
absence of disagreement, but rather a willingness to engage differences productively and to press 
forward together to achieve outcomes acceptable to all, even if some important disagreements 
remained (as they inevitably will in any real-world political process).  The experience of the 
community panel thus appears to support claims that consensus-oriented deliberative processes 
must also incorporate elements of adversarialism to successfully sustain consideration of diverse 
views, encouraging participants to explore their differences and allowing room for negotiating 
them.
78
 
Of course, these findings also suggest the need for additional research into the 
mechanisms that might have promoted such an apparently successful blending of consensus and 
adversarial approaches, such as the role of the facilitator in establishing group norms that prize 
both civil agreement and a willingness to air differences.  We note, too, that the nature of the 
questions the community participants engaged may have played a role in the Silicon Valley 
outcome.  The community panelists tackled only one closed-ended question (should governments 
be involved in municipal broadband), a question on which they quickly agreed.  On the further, 
open-ended questions (how should governments be involved and what is needed to achieve 
digital inclusion), the panel achieved hard-won consensus amid conflict.  But the outcomes may 
have been different if the panel had disagreed more on the initial closed-ended question or if 
their further deliberation had centered on other, closed-ended questions.  More research is 
needed to better understand the ways in which the nature of the questions under consideration 
shape enclave deliberation. 
 
Internal and External Legitimacy 
 
Our final set of research questions had to do with whether this example of enclave 
deliberation was seen as both internally legitimate (by deliberators) and externally legitimate (by 
political actors outside the group).  We have already addressed several factors commonly used to 
define the internal legitimacy of deliberation, presenting data indicating that participants 
perceived they had sufficient information, fully supported the group’s recommendations, and 
deliberated in a climate characterized by openness to a diversity of viewpoints, mutual respect, 
and recognition of disagreement as well as consensus.  In addition, we noted in the introduction 
that deliberative theorists and their critics both judge deliberation’s internal legitimacy based on 
the extent that participants exercise autonomy to make their own decisions rather than being 
coerced by other group members, forum organizers, or mainstream policy discourse.   
Self-reports and objective evidence suggest that the panelists were fairly autonomous.
79
  
When asked to evaluate the decision-making dynamics in the final post-conference surveys, 
participants expressed overwhelming agreement with the idea that the “community panelists’ 
recommendations came from the panelists themselves, not from the conference organizers” 
(mean=1.08, SD=0.29 on 1-5 scale, where 1=”strongly agree” and 5=”strongly disagree) and 
strong disagreement with the statement that “conference organizers influenced the panel’s 
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recommendations too much” (mean=4.67, SD=0.65).  Most participants also rejected the notion 
that “a few members of the community panel dominated the discussion” (mean=3.92, SD=1.00).  
 Perhaps the strongest evidence of the panelists’ level of autonomy was their ability to add 
to the issue agenda outlined by the organizers at the start of the conference.  In particular, the 
panel identified two issue areas that were not mentioned in the briefing paper or initial face-to-
face presentation of the issues by the organizers and made multiple recommendations on each 
area.  The panel raised the issue of protecting municipal broadband users’ privacy and security, 
calling for equal privacy protections for all tiers of service, preventing system operators from 
tracking or selling users’ personally identifiable information, and suggesting several specific 
ways in which broadband providers could notify users about risks to their privacy and security 
online.  The panel also broached the issue of greater public involvement in every stage of 
developing municipal broadband networks, recommending formation of a public advisory board 
and specific steps it could take to guarantee “greater levels of deliberation among community 
residents and frequent two-way communication between residents and other stakeholders.”80  
Beyond the deliberators themselves, policy recommendations that emerge from more 
homogeneous deliberation by marginal groups may be seen as illegitimate by stakeholders on the 
issue, especially if they do not agree with the recommendations.  Because this is a practical 
question that is, strictly speaking, about perceived legitimacy, we measure external legitimacy as 
“the extent to which key actors, decision-makers and the media accept and support the procedure 
and its outcomes.”81  Here we have two sources of data – first, the impressions of the experts and 
advisory panelists who had a supervisory role in examining conference briefing papers and were 
involved in the public hearing, and second, a summary judgment from those who read the 
panelists’ recommendations and attended the follow-up event several months later.  These 
respondents are a small but diverse group of social activists, telecommunications industry 
representatives, and local government representatives who observed various aspects of the 
consensus conference or its outcomes. 
 
Table 4 about here. 
 
These stakeholders tended to evaluate the work of the community panelists quite 
positively.  As we have already seen (Table 2), experts and advisory panelists expressed solid 
agreement with the idea that community panelists and their recommendations were grounded in 
sufficient factual information.  In addition, Table 4 shows that the experts and advisory panelists 
who attended the public hearing believed the presenters reflected a diverse set of views 
(Mean=1.50, SD=.29) and that all different perspectives were treated fairly (Mean=1.25, 
SD=.25).  The experts and advisory panelists expressed moderate levels of confidence that the 
panelists’ recommendations could actually influence subsequent debate (Mean=2.14, SD=.26) 
and affect the perspectives of stakeholders (Mean=2.00, SD=.44). At the same time, the experts 
also recognized that the panelists’ recommendations would not be embraced by all sides and 
would likely be opposed by some interests (Mean=2.29, SD=.57).  In other words, the outside 
experts judged the panelists as having made a substantial contribution to subsequent deliberation 
and decision-making on municipal broadband, articulating perspectives that would be taken 
seriously but that were not simply parroting already-existing views and would likely provoke 
opposition from some quarters. 
The experts judged the panel’s recommendations as well-grounded and realistic, even if 
they did not perfectly match the ideas and perspectives of the experts themselves.  On average, 
 19 
experts and advisory panelists reported moderate levels of support for the recommendations 
(Mean=2.00, SD=.22), although participants in the follow-up event who had read the panelists’ 
report were more enthusiastic (Mean=1.54, SD=.18).  In their open-ended comments, experts 
mentioned a variety of additional concerns and ideas they wished had been part of the panelists’ 
report, but invariably, these engaged stakeholders expressed admiration for the efforts of the 
community panel and treated their work as a significant contribution to ongoing public discourse, 
even if the experts did not agree with all the recommendations.
82
   
 
Conclusion 
 
 This case study suggests that structured enclave deliberation among the less powerful that 
involves immersion in a broad range of policy information and arguments could help resolve the 
concerns of deliberative democracy’s critics, while fulfilling basic criteria for legitimate 
deliberation that are widely shared by deliberative democrats.  Participants in the consensus 
conference increased their knowledge of the issues and experienced modest increases in self-
efficacy and interpersonal trust rather than growing alienated or cynical about civic engagement.  
Instead of adopting groupthink or dangerous forms of polarization, participants perceived greater 
diversity of views the longer they deliberated, yet were able to arrive at a long list of policy 
recommendations.  These recommendations contributed new perspectives to the larger policy 
debate and did not simply parrot the issue agenda outlined by conference organizers.  Both the 
participants and observers in government, industry, and advocacy groups perceived the 
deliberative process and outcomes as legitimate. 
Deliberative democrats are moving away from judging the legitimacy of deliberation by 
the standard of a single ideal speech situation and toward a new appreciation for what different 
forms of deliberation in diverse contexts can contribute to the democratic system as a whole.
83
  
Having moved beyond rigid norms of consensus, the common good, and rationality that 
undermined equal participation, deliberative democrats might well reconsider an exclusive 
commitment to discussion in heterogeneous or quasi-representative groupings.  We have argued 
that the idea of enclaves is complex and may include homogenous viewpoints, structural 
locations, or identities, with features of the deliberative context influencing whether or not 
enclave perspectives are made salient.  We conclude that political inclusion may sometimes be 
served best by incorporating into deliberative civic forums more homogeneous groups of the 
least powerful.  This can be justified on behalf of ensuring equal footing if it improves upon 
cross-cutting deliberative forums’ ability to attract participation by the marginalized, to develop 
their political knowledge and skills, to discover common interests and positions without coercion 
from the privileged or from each other, and to contribute a broader range of arguments to the 
larger public sphere.  Enclave deliberation is compatible with the normative basis for deliberative 
democracy if it is preceded and followed by exposure to the larger public sphere. 
What might this mean for deliberation’s practitioners and researchers?  Comparative 
research on civic forums that include enclave deliberation and those that do not would be most 
helpful at identifying whether and why more homogeneity can boost deliberative quality and 
equality.  Because this study had no comparison group that was more heterogeneous, we cannot 
offer evidence that structured deliberation in more homogeneous groups is better according to 
our measures of equity and quality than deliberation in more heterogeneous groups, only that the 
former need not lead to some of the problems foreseen by traditional deliberative theory and its 
critics.  Comparative research on equality in civic forums with and without enclave discussion 
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would be helpful, but it would depend upon convincing forum organizers to include more 
homogeneous groupings.   
The quality of any deliberative forum is perhaps more complex because it depends on the 
many contextual factors identified by Fung.
84
  Especially salient factors include who deliberates, 
on what issues, and using what deliberative mode.  First, our case study involved a group that did 
not share a powerful group identity at the outset, but shared a structural position in relation to the 
issue of broadband access and during deliberation developed a stronger collective identity as 
representatives of the underserved.  Cases in which participants recognize a more cohesive group 
identity from the start would provide stronger tests of whether enclave deliberation among the 
less powerful can avoid polarizing for the wrong reasons.  Second, our case study group 
deliberated over an issue that was only beginning to surface in the public sphere. Emerging 
issues may be ideal for the quality of enclave deliberation because participants’ interests, 
identities, and commitment to policy options are undiscovered territory.  Under such conditions, 
information tends to be scarce, issues are not yet clearly located in prevailing political frames, 
and interest groups’ and policy makers’ positions are still relatively fluid.  At these times, 
deliberation among the dispossessed may be most likely to be educative, open, authentic, and 
influential.  Other aspects of the issue may have favored good deliberation as well by helping 
clarify participants’ stakes: there was a strong local angle (Silicon Valley’s municipal broadband 
plans), the issue required both discussion of facts (such as whether people take full advantage of 
free services) and values (such as equal opportunity and privacy), and it allowed deliberators to 
draw on their personal experience (of using the Internet).  Research on enclave deliberation 
about issues that are more established, less local, more fact-driven or value-driven, and less 
accessible to personal experience could illuminate whether and how they provide the same 
opportunities for high quality enclave deliberation.  Third, research could help shed light on 
whether other kinds of civic forums besides consensus conferences offer more or less congenial 
homes for productive deliberation by the marginalized.  Spaces for enclave deliberation could 
feasibly be incorporated into all such forums, but they differ in design and purpose in numerous 
ways.
85
  Features of the consensus conference that may be most relevant to deliberative quality in 
enclaves include opportunities to interact directly with policy makers and activists, allowing 
participants to generate their own policy options rather than simply choosing among those 
presented by organizers, and requiring that recommendations be agreed to by consensus rather 
than majority rule.  
Perhaps the most important factor that may influence the quality of enclave deliberation 
is how empowered these forums are in relation to government and other institutions.  The 
spectrum ranges from simply educating community members, to playing a one-time or ongoing 
advisory role to government, to direct enactment of policy. Our case study involved a one-time 
advisory relationship to officials and activists.  This may be the optimal level of empowerment 
for deliberative quality among the disempowered.  In merely educative forums, the stakes may 
be too low for participants to sustain a commitment to the hard work of deliberation.  Although 
we are not aware of civic forums in which disempowered people alone enact policy decisions 
directly,
86
 and the prospects for such forums look dim, were they to come to pass they would 
likely present the same barriers to reaching consensus seen in legislatures, as interest groups 
attempted to “rig the jury” with their surrogates and bring other pressures to bear on behalf of 
their positions.
87
  Ongoing advisory groups of the least powerful might increase in deliberative 
quality as they build issue knowledge and discussion skills.  But prolonged relations with 
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government could also undermine deliberative quality by presenting possibilities for co-optation 
by more powerful policy actors.   
Our proposal need not involve a naïve belief that deliberative quality and equity can be 
entirely perfected, only that they can be improved.  We agree with Joshua Cohen’s recent 
suggestion that quality deliberation, as opposed to lesser forms of discourse and discussion, is a 
“fragile accomplishment” and that it would be overly simplistic to expect that “people are 
waiting to deliberate.”88  Such caution seems to us especially wise with respect to enclave 
deliberation.  Our case study results thus suggest the need for additional systematic research into 
the conditions under which enclave deliberation is likely to result in the sorts of encouraging 
outcomes we found in the Silicon Valley conference.  Consistent with Mutz’s call for testing 
aspects of deliberation that are specifiable and falsifiable,
89
 we encourage further research that 
explores the individual factors that may be necessary to promote successful enclave deliberation.   
At the same time, such research should take seriously the possibility that these factors of group 
composition, issue, deliberative mode, and level of empowerment may interact and be mutually 
reinforcing, such that the whole of deliberative success is more than the sum of its parts, not all 
of which can be neatly and easily separated.  For example, we found in this study that 
information acquisition cannot be easily separated from deliberation itself.  Instead, the 
community panel discovered new information and perspectives throughout the conference, 
including during the final weekend when they deliberated as a group and finalized their 
recommendations.  
One thing is clear: research that simply demonstrates that deliberation fails to reach ideal 
standards is less useful than studies that illuminate when, how, and why deliberation might 
achieve greater equity and quality.  Along these lines, we suggest comparative research on new 
civic forums with and without enclaves of the dispossessed.  Another strand of comparative work 
might assess whether our enthusiasm for civic forums as venues for enclave deliberation would 
be better invested elsewhere.  This research could examine the extent that deliberation in forums 
of disempowered people satisfies criteria of equity and quality compared with other political 
arenas open to them.  Do civic forums offer better prospects for discussion among those who 
hold different views in ways that lead to empowered participation compared with discussion in 
informal social networks, where talk with political opposites can lead to dispirited withdrawal 
from politics?
90
  Might civic forums provide better possibilities for the least powerful to discover 
and express collective interests than in some social movement organizations that have become 
managed by distant professionals, hierarchical, and focused on single issues?
91
  Could civic 
forums inform and interact with deliberation within other movements, such as the global justice 
movement, revitalizing earlier forms of popular discussion in the interests of leadership 
accountability, political education and mobilization?
92
  Could civic forums allow the deliberation 
of the disempowered to exercise more influence than at typical public hearings, which are often 
designed in ways that make it especially difficult for disempowered groups to contribute 
meaningfully to the decision-making process?
93
  If so, forums with enclaves of the marginalized 
might deserve a third cheer. 
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Table 1.  Community Panel and Control Panel Characteristics 
 
          Community          Control 
          Panel (n=12)      Panel (n=15) 
 
Household Income 
   Below median 92% (11) 100% (15) 
   Below 50% of area median 50% (6)   60% (9) 
    
Education 
High school graduate or less  8% (1)   7% (1) 
Technical school graduate 16% (2)   7% (1) 
Some college 16% (2) 47% (7) 
College graduate 50% (6) 27% (4) 
Post-graduate or professional degree   8% (1) 13% (2) 
 
Race/Ethnicity    
   African-American 25% (3)  33% (5) 
   Hispanic 33% (4)  27% (4) 
   Asian/Pacific Islander 25% (3)  20% (3) 
   White 25% (3)  20% (3) 
   Other 12% (1)    0% (0)  
    
Age 
   60 years or older 25% (3) 20% (3) 
   31-59 years 50% (6) 40% (6) 
   Under 30 years 25% (3) 20% (3) 
 
Gender 
   Female 58% (7) 60% (9) 
   Male 42% (5) 40% (6) 
 
Physical Disability 25% (3) 27% (4) 
 
Rural resident  8% (1)   8% (1) 
 
Home broadband access 58% (7) 86% (13) 
 
Notes: Area median income was $87,400 for the four counties of Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, Alameda, and San Mateo, 
California. Some respondents identified with more than one racial/ethnic category.  Some percentages may not total 
100 percent because of rounding. 
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Table 2.  Impressions of Community Panelists’ Knowledge of the Issues 
 
Community Panelists’ Impressions       
 
Question                                              Weekend 1         Weekend 2            Weekend 3 
  Mean                  Mean                   Mean  
 
The conference organizers provided sufficient        1.5        1.4                1.3 
information to enable the community panelists to      (.82)        (.79)         (.45) 
make informed policy recommendations 
 
I learned new information about the issue of broadband        1.2        1.1          1.5 
access that I did not know before this weekend      (.40)        (.29)        (1.17) 
 
This weekend’s community panel discussions are       1.3        1.5          1.4 
helping me see new perspectives I had not considered     (.47)        (.67)         (.90) 
before 
 
I do not yet understand enough to make a good        3.0        3.3          4.7 
recommendation about municipal broadband policy    (1.13)       (1.38)        (.89) 
 
Experts’ Impressions                     
  
Questions              Post-Conference Evaluation 
       
The consensus conference provided sufficient            1.71 
information to enable the community panelists to            (.29) 
make informed policy recommendations.   
 
Questions and comments from community panelists            1.50 
[at the public hearing] showed that they understood            (.29) 
well the important issues related to municipal broadband.  
 
The community panel's recommendations show that the            1.43 
panelists understood well the basic issues surrounding                                    (.20) 
municipal broadband.  
 
Note: All responses are on a 1-5 scale, with 1 meaning “Strongly Agree” and 5 meaning “Strongly 
Disagree”, Standard Deviation in parentheses. 
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Figure 5a 
 
 
 
Figure 5b 
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 Table 3.  Community Panelists’ Views of the Quality of Deliberation 
 
Question      Weekend 1 Weekend 2 Weekend 3 
                                                                          Mean      Mean                Mean 
 
All different perspectives about municipal         1.5       1.3          1.5 
broadband were welcome during the group discussions      (.82)       (.65)         (1.00) 
 
The community panelists carefully considered all        1.5       1.8          1.5 
sides of the issue          (.68)      (1.03)        (.80) 
 
Some important perspectives or ideas about municipal        3.5       3.3                         3.9 
broadband were not adequately considered or discussed      (1.37)     (1.30)        (1.44) 
 
Community panelists respected each other’s ideas,        1.5       1.4           1.4 
even if they disagreed about some important issues      (.82)      (.51)           (.79) 
 
The group discussions this weekend made me         4.9       4.6           4.4 
uncomfortable because there was so much disagreement      (.30)       (.79)          (1.24) 
 
 
Note: All responses are on a 1-5 scale, with 1 meaning “Strongly Agree” and 5 meaning “Strongly 
Disagree.” Standard Deviation in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Expert Views of the Consensus Conference 
 Expert and 
Advisory Panel 
Follow-Up Event 
Participants 
Public Hearing   
Experts who testified at the public hearing 
represented a broad range of views. 
1.50 
(.29) 
 
At the public hearing, all different perspectives 
about municipal broadband were treated fairly. 
1.25 
(.25) 
 
Impact   
The consensus conference will have an impact on 
public policy decisions about municipal 
broadband. 
2.14 
(.26) 
 
The conference will affect the thinking of 
stakeholders in the municipal broadband issue. 
2.00 
(.44) 
 
The community panels' recommendations are 
likely to be opposed by important stakeholders or 
interests. 
2.29 
(.57) 
 
Panel Recommendations   
Some of my preferred issues and ideas did not 
make it into the community panel's 
recommendations. 
3.14 
(.46) 
 
The community panels' recommendations are not 
realistic. 
4.43 
(.30) 
 
I fully support all of the community panel's 
recommendations. 
2.00 
(.22) 
1.54 
(.18) 
N 7 13 
All responses scored on a 1-5 scale, with 1="Strongly Agree" and 5="Strongly Disagree" 
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